his week’s FAR & Beyond blog is authored by Moshe Schwartz, The Coalition for Common Sense in Government Procurement Defense Acquisition Fellow and President of Etherton & Associates, with the assistance of Arzoo Dawoodani.
Acquisition reform season is again upon us, with efforts to overhaul the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and accompanying agency supplements, extensive acquisition reform provisions included in the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (including Title 18 dedicated to acquisition reform), and the release of the Department’s Acquisition Transformation Strategy. How does the Pentagon’s reform efforts stack up?
The ideas and initiatives in the Department of War’s (DoW) strategy are not new. Some have been tried before (longer tenures for PMs, improve DAU, portfolio management, better cost estimating), are already current policy (MOSA, scorecards, buy commercial), or were in the FY26 NDAA (PAEs, establish the Mission Engineering and Integration Activity, repeal outdated statutes, streamline CAS). And some are perennial siren songs (cut bureaucracy, streamline processes, workforce).
This is not criticism; this is good news. Everybody knows what needs to be done to ‘fix’ defense acquisition. We have all talked about what needs to be done; few have been willing or able to do it. Only time will tell if the 158th time is the charm. But the necessary ingredients for success are present:
- Leadership is a prerequisite for success. Current DoW leaders are exhibiting this leadership. One case in point is the Secretary of War’s November 7th press conference on acquisition reform and the accompanying release of the memo “Transforming the Defense Acquisition System into the Warfighting Acquisition System.” And acquisition reform appears to be a focus of DEPSECDEF Feinberg, USD (A&S) Duffey, Army Secretary Driscoll, and Space Force Chief Saltzman, just to name a few.
- Political Will – The current administration—and DoW leadership—has shown remarkable political will to achieve its goals.
- Administration/Congressional Cooperation – Past acquisition reform efforts (i.e. the 800 Panel, Section 809 Panel on Streamlining Acquisition) benefitted from a shared vision between the Administration and Congress. Congress and DoW appear to be aligned on the need for acquisition reform and much of what needs to be done.
- Need – The United States is being challenged around the world. In a growing number of capabilities, the United States is no longer the technology leader (e.g. hypersonics). We need to change.
In looking at the content of the strategy, the initiatives can be roughly broken down into four broad categories: people, process, pace, and industrial base.
People
Defense acquisition is a human activity dependent on the judgments and decisions of the workforce. As the 809 Panel argues, “the ultimate effectiveness and efficiency of defense acquisition depend on and is determined by the people” who make up the acquisition workforce.[1] DoW’s acquisition strategy picks up on this theme, emphasizing the importance of the “warfighting acquisition workforce” and the need to let them “cut through red tape and deliver results.”
A centerpiece of the workforce efforts is establishing Portfolio Acquisition Executives, who would have the authority to make budget and requirements trades, and manage their workforce (contracting officers would report to the PAEs). The strategy also tackles workforce training, including through government-industry exchanges and reorienting Defense Acquisition University (renamed Warfighting Acquisition University) to “foster rapid cross-functional teaming, critical thinking, innovation, and risk taking under operational pressures.” The strategy also calls for “monetary incentive awards” to reward high performers and establishing longer tenures for PAEs and program managers.
Process
The Department’s goal for accelerating the acquisition processes is simple: deliver new capabilities faster, spend resources more efficiently, and ensure a more competitive marketplace. This would be accomplished by streamlining the process, cutting unnecessary steps, and accelerating “risk-based decision-making” the Department seeks.
One example is the Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) Pathway, which has become bogged down by bureaucracy. The strategy seeks to delegate MTAs approvals to the “lowest permissible level,” cut down prototype development and approval processes, and eliminate MTA advisory boards–replacing them with a digitized system that integrates data and identifies concerns. The strategy emphasizes adopting industry-driven solutions, acquiring commercial products and services, and going direct-to-supplier.
Pace
While the strategy does not throw out the traditional balance of cost, schedule, and performance in the context of operational need, it does elevate the importance of speed, declaring that the DoW is moving to a wartime footing to foster a sense of urgency. The strategy establishes a “Wartime Production Unit” to advise on production optimization, engage with PEOs to implement efficiency improvements in production, and accelerate production ramps to meet operational needs.
The strategy also tackles integrating modern engineering techniques and rigorous readiness testing. The emphasis on speed extends beyond just acquisition to readiness and surge capacity.
Industrial Base
The defense industrial base has been shrinking for more than a decade. The strategy seeks to reverse these trends, hoping to spur competition, increase innovation, accelerate production, decrease cost, and generate more private capital investment. To incentivize industry, the Department will “curate a playbook of financial tools,” to include longer contracts, direct loans, loan guarantees, and pre-contract industry investments.
Will This Time be Different?
The tone of the strategy and the Secretary’s speech are promising. Gone is vilifying the existing defense industrial base as the source of all that is wrong with defense acquisitions, which appeared to be the tone earlier on. Also gone are some of the more extreme positions in intellectual property that dissuade companies from working with the Department.
The change in tone should not be confused with letting industry off the hook—DoW must hold industry accountable and embrace creative destruction: companies unable to perform should not survive. DoW must be a tough negotiator. But it must also embrace industry as a partner and recognize that the problems in acquisition are the shared fault of DoW, industry, and Congress. As SECDEF stated, to succeed, DoW needs the entire defense industrial base, including commercial and VC-backed entities that have not yet joined the DIB.
Even with a favorable landscape, the strategy is still just a strategy, and reforms are in the early stages. Some, such as Bill Greenwalt, correctly argue that the strategy does not go far enough, that in the immortal words of GAO, “more needs to be done.” True. But we are more optimistic. The time is right. The political landscape is right. The ideas are right. And our national security depends on it.
[1] Section 809 Panel Interim Report, page 28, May 2017.