According to reports, the Army’s Marketplace for the Acquisition of Professional Services (MAPS) procurement is shifting directions once again. On January 28, the Army announced that the MAPS solicitation was to be released on February 2, 2026, with proposals due the first week in March. However, the timing has changed with another pause in direction. In a February 1, 2026, SAM.gov notice, the Army announced that it would be issuing another draft solicitation before the end of the quarter. Significantly, each delay eats into each potential offeror’s bid and proposal funds supporting their competitive efforts for MAPS. The start and stop pattern of MAPS raises questions. How does MAPS square with the Administration’s efforts to reduce unnecessary, costly contract duplication? Are there any alternatives to MAPS? Is MAPS headed in the right direction?
Unnecessary contract duplication reduces efficiency and raises costs for government and industry, resulting in reduced competition that deprives the government of access to best value solutions from the commercial marketplace. MAPS is duplicative of a host of existing governmentwide acquisition contract (GWAC) vehicles for professional and information technology (IT) services. As such, the Army could immediately be using OASIS+ and any of the GSA or NASA IT GWACs to meet its immediate needs.
The existing GWAC marketplace collectively provides an efficient, effective, and competitive alternative to MAPS. Utilizing pre-existing contract vehicles will save the Army valuable time and funding in executing on the MAPS mission requirements. Such an approach is consistent with the Revolutionary Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Overhaul (RFO) as outlined in FAR Part 8. Moreover, the RFO increases flexibility and efficiency in managing procurement programs through pre-existing, multiple award, GWACs. For example, the RFO authorizes Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs) on multiple award contracts like OASIS+, Alliant 3, and NASA SEWP VI. BPAs are an effective procurement management tool supporting the underlying requirements MAPS seeks to meet. In sum, the management costs of competing, evaluating and administering MAPS are eliminated by the Army if it utilizes ongoing governmentwide contract vehicles. The probable lengthy bid protest process will only increase costs for government and industry. The RFO provides a roadmap for addressing contract duplication, will the Army take it?
Finally, regarding contract administration and “off-ramps,” the MAPS draft solicitation provides that contractors propose on at least 50 percent of the task orders. Failure to propose on at least 50 percent can lead to a contractor being “off ramped” from the contract. This is fundamentally at odds with a truly competitive market. Contractors should not be subject to mandatory competition requirements. Such an approach creates a dynamic of “faux” competition. The result will be zombie proposals that check the competition box but are not effectively responsive to a requirement. The mandate will cost the Army and industry scare bid and proposal funds with no real benefit. Consistent with the RFO and commercial best practices, competition is enhanced through open communication, sound requirements development, and the elimination of government unique processes and procedures.
In summary, taking the RFO roadmap will ensure the highest level of ongoing competition for commercial services, products, and solutions to meet the Army’s mission requirements.